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PEOPLE V HUBBARD: INTERPRETING THE
FAIR CROSS-SECTION REQUIREMENT OF
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION
In People v. Hubbard,' the Michigan Court of Appeals addressed
the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment.2 The
Sixth Amendment guarantees each criminal defendant the right to a
trial by an impartial jury.' The Sixth Amendment applies to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' The
Supreme Court has held that to satisfy the Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial, a jury must be drawn from a representative cross-section
1. 552 N.W.2d 493 (Mich. Ct App. 1996).
2. See id.
3. The Sixth Amendment states in relevant part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law ....
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. See generally Joseph J. Sklansky, Right to Jury Tial, 84 GEO. L.J. 1139 (1996)
(discussing the various issues arising from the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial).
5. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). In Duncan, the Supreme Court
concluded that a criminal defendant's interest in a trial by jury is "fundamental to the American
scheme of justice." Id. The Court held that "the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of
jury trial in all criminal cases which.., would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee."
Id (citation omitted). Thus, criminal defendants challenging state jury procedures must apply a
standard nearly identical to the federal standard. Consequently, after Duncan, courts have
applied the fair cross-section requirement to criminal defendants in both federal and state
courts. See James H. Druff, Comment, The Cross-Section Requirement and Jury Impartiality,
73 CAL. L. REV. 1555, 1560-61 (1985).
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of the community.6 The requirement of a representative jury is
intended to create a jury that reflects a community's diverse societal
values.7 The Court has also held that underrepresentation of a
particular group is cognizable only when the group is a "distinctive"
portion of the population.8
The Hubbard court held that the process used to allocate
prospective jurors in Kalamazoo County, Michigan at the time of the
trial violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment guarantee to an
impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.' The
court found that the circuit court jury that tried and convicted the
defendant resulted from a venire that unconstitutionally
underrepresented the African-American community in Kalamazoo
County.'0 The record in the case established a "complete absence of
African-Americans in the defendant's jury array."' "
Part I of this Recent Development traces the history of the Sixth
Amendment and the fair cross-section doctrine. Part II analyzes the
defective jury selection process used in Hubbard and how the court
reached its conclusion. Part III will discuss the future implications of
the holding and reasoning of the Hubbard Court.
6. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975) (recognizing that a jury selected
from a representative cross section of a community is "an essential component of the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial"). Instead of requiring an impartial jury to represent the
different viewpoints, perspectives, and experiences of a certain community, an impartial jury
should represent a cross-section of the community. See id. at 538 (stating that jury pools "from
which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community
and thereby fail to [reasonably represent the community]").
7. See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 754-56 (Cal. 1978) (noting that the best means
of achieving an impartial jury is to promote a jury composed of various types of people with
different views whose respective biases, "to the extent they are antagonistic, will tend to cancel
each other out").
8. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). Distinctiveness has become the
main focus of the Sixth Amendment test for cognizability. Courts apply different definitions to
the term "distinctive" for both Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. See infra notes 27-28
and accompanying text. "Discrete and insular minorities" will more easily be recognized as
distinctive groups. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
9. See Hubbard, 552 N.W.2d at 504.
10. Seeid.at497.
11. Id. at 498. The defendant raised the Sixth Amendment issue "on the ground that the
juror allocation process employed by Kalamazoo County excluded African-American jurors
from the venire." Id
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I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees that a criminal defendant has the right to a speedy and
public trial by an impartial jury. 2 The Supreme Court has interpreted
the Sixth Amendment's impartiality requirement to mean that a jury
must represent a fair cross-section of the community. 3 The notion of
an impartial jury is symbolized by a group composed of people
representing the various values, viewpoints, and experiences of a
particular community.14 The jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment is designed to protect an individual's rights and liberties
from state infringement. 5 To satisfy the representative requirement of
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13. See, e.g., Lockhart v. MeCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173-74 (1986) (holding that "[tihe
limited scope of the fair-cross-section requirement is a direct and inevitable consequence of the
practical impossibility of providing each criminal defendant with a truly 'representative' petit
jury"); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (noting that the fair cross-section
requirement is "fundamental to the American system of justice"); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493,
503-04 (1972) (Marshall, J., writing for a plurality) (stating that removing any specific group of
individuals from a jury takes away from the jury certain immeasurable characteristics of human
nature and experience beneficial during the jury's deliberation); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404, 410-11 (1972) (White, J., writing for a plurality) (recognizing that a jury should consist of
a group of people constituting a cross-section of the community "who have the duty and the
opportunity to deliberate" without external influence); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100
(1970) (declaring that the number of jury members should be large enough to facilitate group
deliberation, shielded from external influence, and that the jury selection process should allow a
"fair possibility" of obtaining a petit jury that is representative of a cross-section of the
community); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942) (stating that "the proper
functioning of the jury system, and ... our democracy itself," requires juries to be
representative of the community as a whole, and not necessarily any specific group of people);
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (recognizing that "[i]t is part of the established
tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly
representative of the community').
14. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. See also Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories
or Peers?-Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures 64 N.C. L. REV.
501, 545-47 (1986) (stating that one duty of the jury is to incorporate views and experiences
representative of the community into the decision process).
15. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 614 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed.,
1869). Alexander Hamilton expressed that:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in nothing
else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury: Or if there is any
difference between them, it consists in this; the former regard it as a valuable safeguard
to liberty, the latter represent it as the very palladium of free government.
19971
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the Sixth Amendment, however, juries must be randomly selected
from the community. 6
The Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement is based on
fundamental democratic concepts.' 7  The fair cross-section
requirement does not entitle a defendant to a jury that mirrors the
community and reflects the numerous distinctive groups present in
the population.'" Rather, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a
defendant the opportunity for a representative jury by requiring that
jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires 9 from which trial
Id See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968) (characterizing the right to jury
trial as a fundamental right and protection against oppression by the Government).
16. A jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community is more likely to
accomplish the jury's role of functioning as a check on the criminal justice system. See Taylor,
419 U.S. at 530 (stating that the fair cross-section doctrine guards against abuse of power by
judges or prosecutors). See also H.R. REP. No. 90-1076, at 8 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1792, 1797 (stating that the role of the jury is both to understand the case and to
mirror "the community's sense of justice in deciding" the case, and that biased juries which
misrepresent the views of society are a consequence of "significant departures from the cross
sectional goal"); S. REP. NO. 90-891, at 9 (1967) (maintaining that "[a] jury chosen from a
representative community sample is a fundamental of our system of justice"). For more
discussion and background on the Act's debate, see 114 CONG. REC. 3992-93 (1968) (remarks
of Rep. Rogers); 118 CONG. REC. 6938-39 (1972) (remarks of Rep. PofO; 114 CONG. REC.
3999 (1968) (remarks of Rep. Machen); 114 CONG. REC. 6608-09 (1968) (remarks of Sen.
Tydings).
This Recent Development discusses a state court case, and therefore does not address the
Federal Jury Selection and Service Act, which provides that a master juror wheel must be
randomly selected from representative members of the community. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-64
(1994). The fair cross-section requirement however, applies to both state and federal jury
selections. See supra note 5.
17. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 (noting that the idea ofjury representativeness under the
Sixth Amendment is based on fundamental democratic concepts, especially the theory that the
jury's function in the administration of the law is "critical to public confidence in the fairness of
the criminal justice system").
18. Seeid. at538.
19. Jury pools and jury master lists are the sources from which a jurisdiction identifies
potential jurors. The sources are typically voter registration lists, driver registration records, or
other records such as taxpayer lists. The jury wheel refers to those individuals, present on the
master list, who are qualified to be jurors. Potential jurors are then summoned for jury service
from the jury wheel. The jury panel or venire is the group of people summoned for jury service
for a certain trial. The jury (also known as the petit jury) is comprised of those individuals on
the jury panel or venire who are not peremptorily struck. See Darryl K. Brown, The Means and
Ends of Representative Juries, I VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 445, 473 n.2 (1994) (reviewing
HIROSHI FUKARAI ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE
SEARCH FOR JUSTICE (1993)). The Supreme Court has held that the fair cross-section
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courts draw juries must not systematically exclude distinctive groups
in the community." If a jury wheel, pool, panel, or venire
systematically excludes distinctive21 groups, then the resulting jury
fails to constitute a fair cross-section of the community.22
Despite the fact that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal
defendant the right to an impartial jury, there are inherent flaws in the
jury selection process.23 Randomly selected jury panels do not always
completely and accurately represent the community. Randomly
selected panels often underrepresent both racial and ethnic minorities,
as well as other minorities.2 Thus, the two goals of juror master lists,
inclusion of all eligible citizens and representation of all portions of
the community, are difficult to accomplish.'
In an attempt to balance the ideals of the Sixth Amendment with
the realities of random selections the Supreme Court has stated that a
defendant must prove three elements to establish a prima facie
requirement applies to every stage of the jury selection process. See Duren v. Missouri, 439
U S. 357, 363-64 (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538).
20. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 363-64 (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538). See also United
States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1244 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that "the Sixth Amendment
guarantees the opportunity for a representative jury venire, not a representative venire itself')
(citing Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 229 (2d Cir. 1987)); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502-
03 (1972) (Marshall, J., writing for a plurality) (recognizing that a major function of the fair
cross-section requirement is to engender public confidence and create legitimacy in the justice
system, and noting that unrepresentative juries "create the appearance of bias in the decision of
individual cases, and they increase the risk of actual bias as well"). Note that the focus of Sixth
Amendment claims is aimed at the process of selecting juries and not the results of that
procedure. See United States v. Osorio, 801 F. Supp. 966, 975 (D. Conn. 1992) (citing Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986)).
21. See infra notes 27-28.
22. Under a Sixth Amendment challenge to a jury, proof of discriminatory intent is not
required. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 n.26 (stating that "in Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section
cases, systematic disproportion itself demonstrates an infringement of the defendant's interest in
a jury chosen from a fair community cross section"). Additionally, an individual does not have
to be a member of the excluded group to bring a Sixth Amendment challenge. See Taylor, 419
U.S. at 526.
23. See HIROSHI FUKARAI Er AL., RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT
AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 3 (1993).
24. See id.
25. See id. at 46 (citing AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO JUROR
USE AND MANAGEMENT, STANDARD 2 (1983)).
1997]
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violation of the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement.26
First, the defendant must show that "the group alleged to be excluded
is a 'distinctive'27 group in the community."" Second, the defendant
must show that "the representation of [the distinctive] group in
venires from which trial courts select juries is not fair and reasonable
in relation to the number of such persons in the community."'29
Finally, the defendant must show that the "underrepresentation is due
to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process."3
26. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 364. The Duren test makes it easier for a defendant to bring a
Sixth Amendment claim than an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Under Duren: (1) a defendant does not need to prove discriminatory intent; (2) a defendant has
standing even if the defendant is not a member of the allegedly excluded group; and (3) the
standards for determining what qualifies as a "distinctive group" are more relaxed than those
required for the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
27. To show distinctiveness, the Supreme Court has required proof of some attribute that
defines the group. Race, gender, economic status, and religious affiliation are examples of
distinctive groups. See Hemadez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954) (explaining the
requirements of distinctiveness for the first time); see also Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531 (discussing
women as a distinct group); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 222-24 (1946) (stating
that economic status may define a distinctive group); United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662,
676-79 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that both African-Americans and Hispanics are distinctive
groups for purposes of the Duren test); United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155, 1161 (2d Cir,
1989) (holding that Jews are a distinctive group because they constitute a significant portion of
the population); United States v. LaChance, 788 F.2d 856, 864-65 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing
that African-Americans are a distinctive group); United States v. Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57, 65 (2d
Cir. 1974) (same); United States v. Osorio, 801 F. Supp. 966, 977 (D. Conn. 1992) (concluding
that "[tihere is little question ... that both blacks and Hispanics are 'distinctive' groups in the
community for purposes of [Sixth Amendment] analysis).
28. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364. See also United States v. Ashley, 54 F.3d 311, 313 (7th Cir.
1995) (finding that African-Americans clearly meet the "distinctive member of the community"
requirement of the Duren test); United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1246 (2d Cir. 1995)
(employing language similar to Osorio and stating that "[t]here is little question that both
Blacks and Hispanics are 'distinctive' groups in the community for purposes of [the Duren]
tesf'); Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1230 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that "African-Americans
are unquestionably a constitutionally cognizable group," meaning that they can be "singled out
for discriminatory treatment").
29. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364. See also United States v. Osorio, 801 F. Supp. 966, 977 (D.
Conn. 1992) (maintaining that the second prong of the Duren test requires the court to ask
whether a certain distinctive group is substantially underrepresented in the jury wheel); People
v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561,569 (Cal. 1990) (outlining the necessary elements of the Duren test to
prove a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement).
30. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364. Systematic exclusion is exclusion resulting from some
circumstance inherent in the juror allocation process. For instance, a large discrepancy
occurring in every weekly jury venire for almost a year shows that the underrepresentation is
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If a defendant successfully proves that a prima facie fair cross-section
violation has occurred, the burden shifts to the government to show
that "those aspects of the jury-selection process ... that result in the
disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive group" advance a
significant state interest."
II. THE CASE: PEOPLE V. HUBBARD
A Kalamazoo Circuit County court jury convicted Arthur
Hubbard of assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than
murder, extortion, and two counts of possession of a firearm during
the commission of a felony.32 On appeal to the Court of Appeals of
Michigan, the defendant alleged that the process used at the time to
allocate prospective jurors from a master source list excluded
African-Americans from the jury array.33 The defendant claimed that
the exclusion of African-Americans from the jury array violated his
Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury drawn from a fair
cross-section of the community." After elaborating on the jury
selection process employed at the time, the court reversed the
convictions and remanded the case for a new trial.35
Since 1987, Michigan has required that petit juries for the
Kalamazoo County courts be chosen from a source list consisting of
county residents on driver registration or personal identification
cardholder lists.36 A jury board used a computer program to generate
a source list, which identified the prospective jurors by name and
systematic. See id. at 366. One or two instances of a venire being disproportionate, however,
does not prove systematic exclusion. See People v. Hubbard, 552 N.W.2d 493, 504 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1996) (citing Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677, 685 (6th Cir. 1988)).
31. Id at 367-68. See also Ford, 841 F.2d at 681 (discussing the government's burden as
outlined in Duren).
32. See Hubbard, 552 N.W.2d at 496.
33. See id. at 498.
34. See id at 496-97.
35. See id. at 497,504.
36. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.1300 (1996) (defining the terms "driver's license list" and
"personal identification cardholder list"); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.1304 (1996) (describing
the manner in which the jury board selects prospective jurors).
1997]
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address but not by race.37 The computer program assigned a zip code
corresponding to a resident's city and street address if the resident
had a post office box address.3 After assigning zip codes to all
county residents, the computer program added "sector segment
extensions"'39 to the zip codes.40 The computer program then used the
zip codes, the sector segment extensions, and sometimes the street
addresses to determine the court jurisdiction in which each
prospective juror resided.4 The computer then randomly sorted and
assigned names from the source list to each court.42 The computer
allocated prospective jurors first to the two Ninth District Courts,
then to the Eighth District Court, and lastly to the circuit court.43
Finally, the computer assigned those individuals on the source list
who lacked a sector segment extension to the circuit court.
44
The 1990 census figures revealed that African-American adults
residing in Kalamazoo County composed 7.4% of the county's
population.45 The data also showed that African-Americans residing
in the City of Kalamazoo composed 14.77% of the city's
population.46 However, the Kalamazoo County jury allocation system
resulted in the exclusion of 75% of the African-American adults
eligible for jury service from service in the circuit court.47
37. See Hubbard, 552 N.W.2d at 499.
38. See id.
39. A sector segment extension is "a four-digit numerical code added to the end of the
five-digit zip code to identify an individual by residence location." Id
40. See id.
41. Seeid.
42. See id. The jury coordinator determined the number of qualifying questionnaires to be
sent to each court based on each court's anticipated need for jurors and past numbers ofjurors
needed. See id.
43. See id. This allocation process, of which Hubbard's jury was a product, was in effect
from the mid-1980s until July 1992. The juror allocation system used after July 1992 selected
jurors first for the circuit court followed by the various district courts. The change occurred
after an outside study concluded that the old juror allocation process resulted in a significant
underrepresentation of the residents of the City of Kalamazoo in circuit court venires. See Id. at
500.
44. See Hubbard, 552 N.W.2d at 499.
45. See id. at 500.
46. See id.
47. See id. The largest population of African-Americans residing in Kalamazoo County
live in the City of Kalamazoo. See id. Thus, because the juror allocation system substantially
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In order to establish a fair cross-section violation, Hubbard had to
fulfill the three elements of the Duren test.48 The court found that for
fair cross-section purposes, African-Americans are considered a
constitutionally cognizable group.49 Thus, the court held that the
defendant satisfied the first prong of the Duren test.50
The court next determined that Hubbard fulfilled the second prong
of the Duren test.5 Hubbard satisfied the second prong by showing
that the Kalamazoo County jury allocation system substantially
underrepresented African-Americans in the jury pool.52 The problem
in addressing the second prong was that the United States Supreme
Court has not definitively spoken on the issue of disparity created by
underrepresentation.5 3 The Supreme Court has stated neither the
means by which courts should measure disparity, nor the
constitutional limits of permissible disparity.54
As a result of the Supreme Court's lack of direction, courts have
created and applied three different tests by which to measure
disparity.55 These three methods include: (1) the absolute disparity
test;56 (2) the comparative disparity test;57 and (3) the standard
underrepresented residents of the City of Kalamazoo, it resulted in a significant
underrepresentation of African-Americans in the circuit court venires. See id. at 504.
48. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
49. See Hubbard 552 N.W.2d at 501. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
50. See Hubbard, 552 N.W.2d at 501.
51. See id. at 504.
52. See id. at 501.
53. See id.
54. See id.; see also People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561, 570 (Cal. 1990) (noting the
Supreme Court's lack of direction on the constitutional limit of permissible disparity); People v.
Bell, 778 P.2d 129, 143-44 (Cal. 1989) (discussing the several statistical tests recognized by the
Supreme Court and employed by lower federal and state courts but acknowledging that the
Supreme Court has yet to select one specific test by which to measure disparity). Note,
however, that the Supreme Court did use the absolute disparity test in Duren. See infra note 56.
55. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. See generally David Kairys et al., Jury
Representativeness: A Mandate for Multiple Source Lists, 65 CAL. L. REv. 776 (1977)
(attempting to quantify standards for inclusiveness and representativeness); Cynthia A.
Williams, Note, Jury Source Representativeness and the Use of Voter Registration Lists, 65
N.Y.U. L. REV. 590, 608-16 (1990) (discussing statistical methods used by various courts to
determine disparity).
56. See Hubbard, 552 N.W.2d at 501. The absolute disparity test is also known as the
absolute numbers or absolute impact test. See id. For discussions on the use of the absolute
disparity test, see United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1246-48 (2d Cir. 1995); Ramseur v.
1997]
Washington University Open Scholarship
428 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 52:419
deviation test.58 In Sixth Amendment fair cross-section cases, courts
typically apply the absolute disparity test.59
The trial court in Hubbard failed to properly identify which test it
used to determine the level of disparity.' The correct disparity test
for the court to apply was an issue of first impression in Michigan.
61
Although the absolute disparity test is typically applied in fair cross-
section cases,62 the Hubbard court refused to adopt this test for
Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1231 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 678 (2d Cir.
1990); United States v. McAnderson, 914 F.2d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Test,
550 F.2d 577, 587 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Osorio, 801 F. Supp. 966, 977-78 (D.
Conn. 1992). See also infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
57. See Hubbard, 552 N.W.2d at 501. Comparative disparity is determined by dividing
the absolute disparity by the population figure for a population group. Comparative disparity
measures the diminished likelihood that people in an underrepresented group will be summoned
for jury duty when compared to the general population. See Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1231-32 See
also Sanders, 797 P.2d at 570 n.5 (offering the following formula for calculating comparative
disparity: "[(A - B) / A ] x 100 = the comparative disparity, where: A = the percentage of the
community making up the cognizable group in question .... and B = the percentage of the jury
venire which is composed of the cognizable group in question").
58. See Hubbard, 552 N.W.2d at 501; see also Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1232 n.17 (stating
that the standard deviation calculation measures the likelihood of a deviant result occuning by
chance and providing an example of standard deviation analysis). The standard deviation test is
also referred to as the deviation from expected random selection test or the statistical decision
theory. See Hubbard, 552 N.W.2d at 501. See generally Michael 0. Finkelstein, The
Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HAM, L. REV.
338 (1966) (using statistical decision theory to show the extreme improbability that
nondiscriminatory selections occurred in situations where courts have refused to find a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
59. See Hubbard, 552 N.W.2d at 501; see also Bell, 778 P.2d at 142 n.14 (recognizing
that many federal court have approved the absolute disparity test as the means for a defendant to
prove a fair cross-section violation). Courts are more likely to apply the comparative disparity
and the standard deviation tests in equal protection cases. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482, 495-96 (1977) (applying the statistical decision theory to an equal protection jury claim);
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 626-31 (1972) (discussing the statistics used in an equal
protection claim in the context of a grand jury); Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1231-33 (3d
Cir. 1992) (examining all three methods in determining the validity of an equal protection claim
and a Sixth Amendment claim); Alston v. Manson, 791 F.2d 255, 258-59 (2d Cir. 1986)
(concluding that the statistical decision theory is a reliable tool in determining whether there is
substantial underrepresentation in the jury array because it reveals the possible role of chance
and works well where a small sample is involved).
60. See Hubbard, 552 N.W.2d at 501. See infra note 99 (discussing the appellate court's
same failure to identify which disparity test it used).
61. See Hubbard, 552 N.W.2d at 501.
62. See supra note 59.
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several reasons.63
The absolute disparity test measures the difference between the
proportion of the general population the distinctive group represents
and its proportion on the source list.' The absolute disparity in
Hubbard was 3.4% to 4.1%.65 Under the absolute disparity test,
disparities between 2.0% and 11.2% are statistically insignificant.'
Therefore, numbers falling within this range, including the absolute
disparity of 3.4% to 4.1% found in Hubbard, do not constitute
substantial underrepresentation.67
The distinctive group in Hubbard, African-Americans, constituted
a small percentage of adults available and qualified to serve as
jurors." The Hubbard court believed that applying the absolute
disparity test would create a dangerous precedent.6 9 If the juror
allocation process used in Kalamazoo County had excluded all
African-Americans in the adult Kalamazoo County population, the
absolute disparity would have been 7.4%. This number, however,
still would have failed to constitute substantial underrepresentation. 71
Hypothetically, the juror selection method employed by Kalamazoo
63. See Hubbard, 552 N.W.2d at 501.
64. See id.: see also Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1231 (3d Cir. 1992); People v.
Sanders, 797 P.2d 561, 570 n.5 (Cal. 1990).
65. Hubbard, 552 N.W.2d at 502. Residents of the City of Kalamazoo regularly composed
between 2% and 17% of the prospective jurors made available for circuit court jury service.
Adult African-Americans constituted 7.4% of the Kalamazoo County population. Based on
statistical estimates, adult African-Americans composed 3.3% to 4% of the Kalamazoo Circuit
Court venires between July 10, 1990 and July 9, 1991. The absolute disparity of 3.4% to 4.1%
in Hubbard resulted from subtracting 4% from 7.4% and subtracting 3.3% from 7.4%. See id.
66. See Hubbard, 552 N.W.2d at 501. For cases holding that absolute disparities between
2% and 11.5% fail to constitute substantial underrepresentation, see United States v. Hafen, 726
F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 1984); Bryant v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1373, 1377-78 (11th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436,442 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d
150, 155 (8th Cir. 1981); United States ex rel. Barksdale v. Blackburn, 639 F.2d 1115, 1126-27
(5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 1977); Thompson v.
Sheppard, 490 F.2d 830, 832 (5th Cir. 1974).
67. See Hubbard, 552 N.W.2d at 502.
68. See id. ("[A]dult African-Americans composed 7.4 percent of the Kalamazoo County
population.").
69. See id.
70. See id. This number is obtained by subtracting 0% from 7.4%.
71, See id.
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County could have barred all African-Americans from serving on
juries and still have satisfied the absolute disparity test.72 If the
Hubbard court had adopted the absolute disparity test, a Sixth
Amendment challenge would not have been possible because the
total percentage of African-American adults in Kalamazoo County
constituted a percentage less than what is required to be statistically
significant for a fair cross-section violation.7"
Rather than apply the absolute disparity test to determine the level
of disparity present, the Hubbard court chose to follow the approach
taken in United States v. Osorio.74 In Osorio, the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut held that the
unintentional exclusion of residents from the jury wheel, which
resulted in the exclusion of two-thirds of African-Americans and
Hispanics, constituted systematic exclusion of those groups from the
jury selection process.75 Thus, the Osorio court determined that the
jury selection process violated the fair cross-section of the Sixth
Amendment.
76
The Osorio court applied the absolute disparity test when
evaluating whether the defendant had satisfied the second element of
the Duren test.77 Although the absolute disparity was only 3.26% for
African-Americans,7" the Osorio court found that the defendant had
shown substantial underrepresentation under a Sixth Amendment
analysis where the disparity resulted from "non-benign"
circumstances.79
72. See id.
73. See Hubbard, 552 N.W.2d at 502.
74. See id. at 502-03 (referring to United States v. Osorio, 801 F. Supp. 966 (D. Conn.
1992)).
75. See Osorio, 801 F. Supp. at 980.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 977-78.
78. See id. at 978. The absolute disparity for Hispanics was 4.3%. See id.
79. See id.; see also United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1246.48 (2d Cir. 1995)
(using a method similar to the Osorio court to find that the underrepresentation was substantial
enough to violate the Sixth Amendment).
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The Osorio court recognized the Second Circuit's warning80
regarding the weaknesses of the absolute disparity test.8 The Second
Circuit acknowledged that the degree of underrepresentation found in
United States v. Biaggi2 pushed the absolute disparity test to its
limit.8 3 In Biaggi, the Second Circuit determined that it would be
more likely to find a Sixth Amendment violation "if the
underrepresentation had resulted from any circumstance less benign
than voter registration lists."" Following the Second Circuit, the
Osorio court held that the exclusion of certain residents from the jury
wheel was not due to random chance and therefore the
underrepresentation was not benign.8" As in Hubbard, the lack of a
representative sample of African-Americans (and Hispanics) in the
Osorio jury pool led to the lack of minorities on the jury.86
The Hubbard court determined that the level of disparity in
Kalamazoo County was similar to the level of disparity in Osorio.87
The evidence in Hubbard disclosed that the jury selection process
used by Kalamazoo County before July 1992-and not merely
random chance-caused the underrepresentation of African-
80. See United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 678 (2d Cir. 1990).
81. See Osorio, 801 F. Supp. at 978.
82. See Biaggi, 909 F.2d at 678.
83. See Osorio, 801 F. Supp. at 978 (citing Biaggi, 909 F.2d at 678). The risk of
employing the absolute disparity test is that it does not consider the size of the underrepresented
group. See id According to the Biaggi court,
The risk of using [the absolute disparity approach] is that it may too readily tolerate a
selection system in which the seemingly innocuous absence of small numbers of a
minority from an average array creates an unacceptable probability that the minority
members of the jury ultimately selected will be markedly deficient in number and
sometimes totally missing.
Biaggi, 909 F.2d at 678.
84. Biaggi, 909 F.2d at 678. The Biaggi court held the underrepresentation of African-
Americans and Hispanics to be "benign" because there was no evidence that the
underrepresentation had ensued from any circumstances other than random selection of names
from the voter registration lists. See id.
85. See Osorio, 801 F. Supp. at 978 (stating that the facts in Osorio "reveal circumstances
far less benign than the use of voter registration lists").
86. See id. at 978-79.
87. See Hubbard, 552 N.W.2d at 503.
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Americans on the jury panel."8 Concluding that the level of disparity
present in Hubbard constituted substantial underrepresentation for
Sixth Amendment purposes, the court determined that the defendant
satisfied the second prong of the Duren test."
Finally, the court found that Hubbard had fulfilled the third prong
of the Duren test." The defendant showed that the
underrepresentation of African-Americans was due to systematic
exclusion.9 Specifically, the court found that the jury selection
system used by Kalamazoo County between the mid-1980s and mid-
1992 was the primary cause of the underrepresentation of African-
Americans in the circuit court venires.92 Both statistical and
testimonial evidence showed that African-Americans were
significantly underrepresented in the jury pool.93 Thus, the Hubbard
court concluded that the defendant had satisfied all three prongs of
the Duren test and consequently found that the Kalamazoo County
juror allocation system violated the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-
section requirement.94
III. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Inevitably the Hubbard decision will affect subsequent Michigan
cases regarding which level of disparity test to apply in cases of Sixth
Amendment fair cross-section violations. Rather than advocating one
of the existing tests, the Michigan court opted to apply the absolute
disparity test but declined to follow it.95 Thus, Hubbard leaves future
Michigan courts uncertain as to which disparity test to apply.
Additionally, the Hubbard court warned that future fair cross-section
88. See id.
89. See id. at 504.
90. See id. See also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
91. See Hubbard, 552 N.W.2d at 504.
92. See id.
93. See id. Statistics of the racial arrangement of the jury arrays for a forty-nine week
period from July 1990 to July 1991 showed that African-Americans were significantly
underrepresented in the venires. See id,
94. See id.
95. See supra notes 51-89 and accompanying text.
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cases should be determined on a case-by-case basis.96
The Hubbard court did not desire the result yielded by the
absolute disparity test.' The absolute disparity found in Hubbard,
3.4% to 4.1%, did not constitute substantial underrepresentation as
generally defined by courts applying the absolute disparity test.98 The
Hubbard court chose to find the juror allocation system
unconstitutional based on the policies behind the Sixth Amendment.
Although the court could have applied any of the disparity tests, it
needed to precisely state which test it endorsed. May Michigan courts
in the future apply the absolute disparity test and then, regardless of
its results, decide whether the juror allocation system violates the
Sixth Amendment? Rather than apply the absolute disparity test,
should Michigan courts in the future employ the comparative
disparity or the standard deviation tests? By failing to definitively
choose a test, the Hubbard decision does not answer these
questions."
The Hubbard court could have opted to apply all three tests and
weigh the different results. In both Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
cases, courts have analyzed the level of substantial
underrepresentation in the jury array on the basis of more than one
disparity test."' ° If the Hubbard court had applied another test, it may
96. See Hubbard, 552 N.W.2d at 505. The Hubbard court warned that the decision would
have retroactive application only to the extent of either (1) direct appeals that are currently
pending or (2) appeals that are filed after the Hubbard decision where the juror allocation
process was correctly raised in the trial court. See id. at 504-05. The Hubbard court alerted
judges and juries that its decision did not entail automatic reversal of otherwise valid
convictions from the Kalamazoo Circuit Court obtained while Kalamazoo County employed the
flawed juror allocation process. See id at 505. See, e.g., People v. Dixon, 552 N.W.2d 663, 667
(Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that because the defendant's challenge to the same juror
allocation process found unconstitutional in Hubbard was untimely, the defendant forfeited
appellate consideration of the Sixth Anendment jury issue).
97. See supra notes 74-89 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 65-66.
99. Ironically, the Court of Appeals in Hubbard criticized the trial court for failing to
identify which test it applied to determine the level of disparity. See Hubbard, 552 N.W.2d 493
at 501.
100. See, e.g., Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1231 (applying all three tests of absolute disparity,
comparative disparity, and standard deviation to ascertain whether a substantial
underrepresentation occurred).
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have found a fair cross-section violation while providing lower courts
with a clear guideline to follow in future cases. The court's rationale
seems result-oriented. Although the question of which test to use was
a question of first impression in Michigan, the Hubbard court did not
succinctly state which test, if any, it employed.'
Substantively, however, the result reached in the Hubbard case is
promising. Despite the court's lack of clarity regarding which test to
apply, the court's detailed reasoning advances the policies behind the
Sixth Amendment. 0 2 Optimistically, after Hubbard, Michigan juror
selection processes will not result in substantial underrepresentation
of African-Americans 3 but will instead promote overall confidence
in the fairness of the criminal justice system." 4 Random selection
from voter registration lists 5 consistently underrepresents racial
minorities.'0 6 For a variety of reasons, some members of society may
not be registered to vote.'0 7 Thus, jury wheels often do not represent a
fair cross-section of the community. Although it is important for
courts to recognize this widespread phenomenon, it may be equally
necessary to consider different juror allocation systems' 8 that could
101. See supra note 99. Note, however, that both federal and state courts generally tend to
avoid employing per se formulas. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. See also
Walter P. Gewin, An Analysis ofJury Selection Decisions, attached as an appendir to Foster v.
Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 830-36 (5th Cir. 1975).
102. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
103. African-Americans are one example of a "distinctive" group. There are, however,
numerous other groups constituting "distinctive" groups for purposes of Sixth Amendment
analysis. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
104. For a more thorough discussion of the notions of democratic heritage and public
confidence in the legal system, see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975).
105. Voter registration lists are the most common source for juries. See Brown, supra note
19, at 451. "[C]ourts have permitted the exclusive use of voter registration lists as a juror source
except where cognizable groups are poorly reflected or statutory restrictions prevent a group's
presence on the voting rolls." Druff, supra note 5, at 1563.
106. See supra notes 103, 105. See also infra note 107.
107. See FUKARAI, supra note 23, at 18, 54-55 (declaring that racial minorities have lower
rates of voter registration and contending that they possess a "Widespread mistrust of
government and those with legal authority" and, as a result, have come to mistrust institutions
such as law enforcement agencies).
108. Especially at the state level, some jurisdictions have attempted to obtain more
representative jury wheels by supplementing voter registration lists with other sources, such as
driver registration records, public benefits records, property tax records, and annual local census
data. See id. at 46-47.
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solve the fair cross-section requirement. The Hubbard decision is a
step forward in creating juror allocation systems that attempt to
provide juries representing a fair cross-section of the community.
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